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the last economics panel of the day, sponsored by The
Brattle Group.

I take off my Fordham Competition Law

Institute hat, and I now put on my Director of Global
Development at The Brattle Group hat for this panel.
I’m excited about the panel because I’ve
been somewhat exposed to this subject of structural
modeling, but I think to many it is either not heard
of or somewhat mysterious.
So my first question is — show of hands, not
being bashful — how many of you believe you know what
structural modeling is?
[Show of hands]
Okay, a couple of economists, and that’s all
we have.

That’s good.

That’s very good.

Well, you’re going to find out something
this afternoon because we have really an incredible
panel of economists and practitioners.
First, two to my left, Dr. Ariel Pakes at
Harvard, who is, for those in the know, coauthor with
Steven Berry and James Levinsohn of a fundamental
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paper in this area, the “BLP paper,” which may be in
some sense described or not.
Dr. Ali Yurukoglu out of Stanford at the far
end also has a seminal paper, the Crawford and
Yurukoglu paper involving de-bundling of media, for
those in the know.
To my left, Art Burke at Davis Polk, who has
actually litigated structural modeling, which was the
first time, and it doesn’t happen very often.

Art

also does merger work.
Ken Schwartz, my former partner at Skadden
Arps, has to deal with all types of data, modeling,
and what economists like to do at the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
and so has been exposed in various degrees to this
kind of analysis.
I’m going to turn it over right away to
Ariel and Ali — they can divide it up how they want —
to first describe what structural modeling is and what
do you need to do it, and then we’ll hop into some
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follow-up questions from that.
PROF. PAKES:

Ali and I made slides.

I

didn’t know quite what to do, so what I decided to do
is —
[Slide] Structural modeling is a way of
doing things.

It’s not any particular thing.

What I

decided I would do is go over one example and then
compare it to what you would do on the same example if
you weren’t doing structural modeling and show you the
advantages of doing structural modeling.

The simple

example is going to be a merger analysis.
[Slide] The big advantage of structural
modeling is it gives you a consistent framework to do
counterfactuals — or but-for modeling, if you like.
What “consistent” means in this context is the
conclusions follow directly from the assumptions.

In

the case I’m going to go over now, the assumptions and
limitations have been studied.
The advantage of the conclusions following
directly from the assumptions is you can actually
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question one of the assumptions and we can see how it
changes the result.

Straightforwardly, hopefully.

Let me give you the classic example.
we analyze price setting?

How do

I need three things to

analyze price setting:
• I need a model that tells me the demand
for a given product, given the prices and
characteristics of all products that are being
marketed.

That’s what we call a demand system.
• I need a model for the cost of producing

those products.
estimated.

These are two things that have to be

They are primitives.

• Third, I need an assumption on how prices
are set, given the demand for these products and the
cost for the products.
[Slide] The assumption derives from John
Nash, who won the Nobel Prize for it.
point.

It is a rest

What each firm is doing is it is choosing a

price to maximize its profits given what every other
firm is doing, and every firm is doing this.
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Why do we look there for the rest point?
It’s because if a firm is doing the best it can given
what everybody else is doing, there’s no reason for it
to change its actions. If there was a firm that wasn’t
doing the best it can given what everybody else was
doing, so it wasn’t in a Nash equilibrium, you would
expect it to eventually change its price.

The rest

point assumption is a natural place to look for how
prices would change.
If you were setting prices, the rest point
actually is very intuitive.

The way you get it is the

following: You increase the price of a good by a
dollar.

For everybody who stays with your good and

doesn’t leave you get an extra dollar.

For those who

leave you lose the markup price minus marginal cost.
When those two things equate, the equilibrium is
there.
I keep on increasing my price as long as I
get more from the people who stay than I lose from the
people who leave.
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leaves?

The markup price minus marginal cost.
That’s the characterization of equilibrium.

If you get that, you’ve got a Nash equilibrium.
[Slide] I want to show you how we have done
and why we use this.

It’s easy to check whether this

notion of pricing equilibrium makes sense in a given
market provided you have the demand system and the
cost system.
Let me say the disadvantage of going this
route is that it takes data and time.

It’s going to

take more time and more data than the standard way of
doing things, which I’ll come back to in a second.
It’s easy to check because if I do have a
demand system — and that’s where this BLP stuff comes
in — the price should equal cost plus a markup.
You’re going to keep on increasing the price until
this condition is met; and as long as you have
marginal costs — you know price equals markup — the
increment of people will equal the markup.

The gain

from the people who stay will equal just the markup,
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and you can take the markup directly down from the
demand system.
[Slide] Let me give you an example.

This is

a paper that just came out in the American Economics
Review by Tom Wollmann.

Somebody referred to the last

paper of Tom Wollmann in the morning when I was here.
He had a separate demand system.

We

regressed the prices on the determinants of cost that
he had in his data and the predicted markup that came
from this separate demand system.

Then we look at the

fit of this equation: how well does it do?
The coefficient of the markup, which we take
directly down, should be 1.
says it should be.

That’s what the theory

Then I’m going to look at how well

we fit over time.
Let me just say, given the demand system at
least, he didn’t have measures of cost.
economic research cost is proprietary.

Typically for
But if we’re

at the Department of Justice, they can sometimes
requisition it, so you might be able to do better than
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this.
[Slide] These are the estimates.
to look at two things.

I want you

This is a published paper.

We

took the demand system from the published paper and
did these regressions.
You get an R2 of either 0.86 (if you don’t
put in time dummies) or 0.94.

That’s about as good a

fit as any equation in the social sciences, period,
never mind economics.
It’s true that it’s a cross-sectional
relationship and there are big differences in the
characteristics of these different products, but when
you go over time, nothing is changing for a given
product over time, same characteristic exactly over
time.

And the cost functions don’t change, just wages

is the only thing, and they don’t change.
[Slide] So the only thing that’s changing is
the markup.

How is the markup determined?

It’s

determined from the demand system, and it’s determined
depending on who’s competing with you.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

Therefore, the

10

things that are changing the markup over time are just
the number of competitors and where they are, how
close they are in characteristic space to your
product.
When you do that, you still get 60 percent
R2, which again for the social sciences is incredibly
high.
[Slide] Now let me go back to the merger
analysis.

I told you how these prices are set, and I

showed you that it sort of works, at least in this one
case.

Actually, it works in many cases, which is the

reason it has sort of taken over.
What happens after a merger?
products merge.
a dollar.

Say two

Now I’m going to increase my price by

I get a dollar from everybody who stays.

Some people leave.

I lose the markup on those people,

on my first group, but now some of them go to the
other good.

Is that clear?

Seeing some of them go to the other good, I
don’t lose so much.
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good, and price keeps going up, and that’s the reason
prices are higher after the merger.
You can show just by writing down the thing
that in this Nash equilibrium after the merger the
amount the price goes up is a function of the
diversion ratio, the fraction of the people who leave
who go to your second good.

That’s all that is.

You take all those people who leave and look
at how many are going to go to the second good (that’s
the diversion ratio) and then the markup on the second
good, because if the markup on the second good is very
high, you keep on increasing price because that’s
where you’re getting it back.
If we have the demand system and the current
prices, we can compute merged prices.

Again, you have

to have the demand system and you have to have the
current prices — that’s nontrivial — but once you get
it, it’s pretty easy.
[Slide] What would you compare this to that
came before?

There are two, really.
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There is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), which is an index of concentration in the
industry.
Index?

What’s wrong with the Herfindahl-Hirschman

You can derive this index exactly from a

theory when all the goods are exactly the same.
Different companies are putting different quantities
on the market, maybe because they have different cost
functions, but the goods are exactly the same.
Where the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index comes
from is you’re assuming that goods are either perfect
substitutes, so if you increase the price a little bit
everybody goes to the second good, or they’re not
substitutes at all.

If they’re perfect substitutes,

they go in the denominator of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index; if they’re not, they don’t count at all.

Is

that clear?
That’s just never true.
a partial substitute.

Goods actually are

There is a fraction of them

(the diversion ratio) that is between zero and 1, and
you can never get an accurate measure of market power
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from this thing.
Moreover, it’s going to end up leading you
to unnecessary debates about what’s in the
denominator.

Is the thing in the denominator or not?

Really, it’s just partially in the denominator at some
level.
[Slide] That was what was wrong with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.

I’m not the first one to

know this.
The thing that came later was this Upward
Price Pressure (UPP).

What is Upward Price Pressure?

It’s just what I told you a second ago: it’s a
diversion ratio times the markup of the second good.
That’s all it is.
The reason that you’ve heard about it is
sometimes it can be approximated without doing the
whole demand system.

Especially for producer goods,

you can go ask producers, “What fraction would leave
if you increased the price by $100 — or whatever —
$1000, whatever it is?”
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the diversion ratio is without estimating the whole
demand system.
It’s much harder for retail goods, by the
way, because for retail goods you have to have a real
sample of all the people who are going to choose.
has to be random.

It

For producer goods you might know

actually who are the people who consume this good.
It’s an improvement over HHI because it
takes into account what partial substitution really
is.
The problem with it is it evaluates
everything at premerger prices, so it takes the markup
premerger and the fraction that would move premerger.
Is that clear?
So, what’s really happening with the merger
is it’s true that one will tend to go up by the markup
times the diversion ratio to the second good, but the
second good is also increasing its price.

Is that

clear?
That will feed back into the first good.
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you just do the diversion ratio on the first good,
it’s not a Nash equilibrium for the second good.

It

was a Nash equilibrium before — it was doing the best
it could — and now you’ve changed the second good’s
price, so it’s not a Nash equilibrium anymore.
Therefore, you have to solve for it jointly.

That’s

what’s called the diversion ratio.
The UK Competition and Markets Authority
(CMA) has started to look at that.

It’s still partial

because it holds other competitors constant, just the
two goods it does together, but again it’s a step in
the right direction.
[Slide] I’m going to give it to Ali now.
You can go from this to much more complicated things,
but Ali will start that.

Maybe I’ll come back.

Another one of the things that have just
started to be used, and actually we’re using it in
stuff, is vertical markets.

Ali can talk to you about

that in bundling.
MR. KEYTE:
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question, though, before you –
PROF. PAKES:

One more word and then you can

ask.
Let me just say that the other thing that is
pretty easy to do if you have a demand system is
product repositioning, which is something that has
been ignored largely in court cases, and I can show
you industries where I know it’s of vital importance.
People can reposition products faster than they can
move prices in several industries.
MR. KEYTE:
question.

That was going to be my

Most people who have done at least merger

work are familiar with UPP and its tendency to be
static and not account for supply responses from other
competitors, new entrants.
PROF. PAKES:

How do you model that?

Let me just say there are

partial models for all of that.

I want to give it to

Ali so he can tell you about vertical stuff.

I think

Ali might tell you something about entry also.
The more you get into it, the harder it is
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and the more assumptions you’re going to have to make.
When making assumptions, at least you know what you’re
assuming when you get an answer.

So, it’s not

necessarily bad, but it does take more time and it
does require more assumptions.
We can do entry.

I’m doing it right now

PROF. YURUKOGLU:

Good afternoon.

actually.

to the organizers for inviting me.

Thank you

I also prepared

some slides.
I’m going to take a step back.

I was asked

to talk a little bit about the ingredients that go
into a structural model.
[Slide] I just want to give a high-level
overview of those ingredients, basically three steps:
a specification, a model estimation, and then a
simulation.

I’ll discuss what’s good about doing

things this way and what are the pitfalls.
I have a running example of thinking about
the question of: What would happen if the government
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regulated unbundling of cable television, which is a
paper I wrote with Greg Crawford several years ago.
[Slide] These empirical economic models —
that’s what I like to call them more than the term
“structural”; I think structural is hard to
understand, and people react weirdly to it, so these
are really just empirical economic models.
There are three steps:
• The first step is you have to specify a
theoretical model of consumer and firm behavior.
Ariel alluded to, this can be very general.
have many different effects.
effects you add.

As

You can

It gets harder the more

The most well-trodden path is merger

simulation, where basically there are consumers like
us buying stuff from firms that sell directly to them
and the set of products is fixed.
I’m not going to get into the details of
most of this stuff.

This specification ends up being

a system of mathematical equations with lots of Greek
letters.

Ariel worked out a lot of this stuff in his
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career and did a lot of important work.
At the end of the day you get a map — it’s
on the computer — where you plug in inputs like: How
much do consumers like this product?
this product cost to make?

How much does

You get outputs like

prices and market shares.
• The next step is to estimate the
parameters of those models.

For different parameters

you’ll get back different answers for what prices
ought to be and market shares ought to be in the
market.
• The estimation step is to discipline the
model by choosing the parameters so that the
predictions of the model match what we’ve seen
previously in the data.

We’re calibrating the

parameters of the model so that we’re predicting what
has happened in the past, and that gives us the
confidence to then take that model and those
parameters and simulate alternative scenarios by
changing the rules of the model.
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take a firm out or you can merge two firms, and those
parameters will give you a prediction for what should
happen now.
[Slide] I’ll talk a little bit more about
this, but at a high level the benefit is being able to
explicitly use economic theory and state your
assumptions.

Furthermore, it allows you to combine

related data sets, data sets from different areas of
the market that regression analysis or UPP analysis
might not be easy to combine.
The downside is that these are very
computationally intensive, and they have many
assumptions.

That combination means it’s hard to test

the robustness of those assumptions.

Sometimes it’s

just very costly to try all the different combinations
of assumptions, and you’re open to the criticism that,
“Well, if you change this assumption, this might not
work, but you didn’t have enough time or resources to
try that and see what would happen.”
[Slide] Here’s the example of cable
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bundling.

Think circa 2005 — so before Netflix,

Amazon, all that stuff — there were movements to
mandate unbundling of channels, actually coming from
Republicans in Congress for a variety of reasons, and
there was an antitrust case.
The thing is we’ve never actually seen
unbundling happen — in every country the TV providers
bundle — let alone in many comparable environments,
where you could do sort of a regression analysis and
see what a bundled world would look like compared to
an unbundled world.
How do we evaluate such a policy using
economics and data?

It seems like something an

economist ought to be able to say something about.
It’s not a crazy question.
[Slide] This is how we do it.
model of the industry.

We build a

We bring in data on that

industry — basically how much time do people spend
watching various channels, how much money do they
spend for products, what packages do they buy — and
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then we combine that with economic theory to get this
machinery to simulate unbundling.

We can actually get

an answer this way.
That answer comes with all the assumptions
that go into the model, but you can discuss those
assumptions, you can debate those assumptions, and
actually get an answer.
MR. KEYTE:

Ali, let me ask you one question

in the middle of that.

What if you can’t replicate

when you start the actual world?

How much are you

allowed, in a sense, within the profession, the
industry, to assume certain things away to get it to
solve, to get it to replicate before you import the
change?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

There are multiple levels

to that question.
Imagine you had all the data you could ever
want.

In that hypothetical world, if you can’t

replicate the previous world, then I think you’re not
good enough at modeling to be engaging in this
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exercise.
There’s another world where you made your
discovery or request for a bunch of data, and you get
a bunch of data that’s not very good, and you’re
stuck.

Then you start making assumptions, and I think

we should allow for not matching every possible
feature of the world.
MR. KEYTE:

We’ll talk to the lawyers here

about some of the Daubert issues that are raised by
that.
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

I don’t want to dominate

the whole discussion, but let me just quickly run
through.
[Slide] In the cable bundling specification,
here’s what the model has to tell you in words.
You have to say, “Who are the agents?”
agents are the entities in the model.

The

You have

consumers like us who buy TV; you have the cable and
satellite distributors; and you have the content
makers.

That’s one way to cut off an industry from
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the rest of the world.

Those are your players.

You have to ask, “What are those agents
allowed to do?”

Consumers can choose what package to

buy, what channels to watch, how much time to watch
each channel.

The cable and satellite firms can

choose what prices to charge and what channels to
include, what packages to offer.

The content makers

can, for example, negotiate prices with cable and
satellite distributors.
There are some actions that they take in the
real world that I’ve left out here because it’s a
model, like content makers deciding how good or how
many programs to make.
Then you have to ask: What happens?
are their payoffs?

What

What is their benefit of taking

certain actions when other agents take other actions?
Consumers want to entertain themselves and not spend
too much money, and firms usually just want to make
money.
Finally — and Ariel talked a bunch about
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this — you need some equilibrium notion that pins down
what actions are going to be taken by each of the
agents.
[Slide] The next step is the estimation
step, which James asked about.

In the cable case, you

input tastes for channels, like how much do people
like different channels.

You can have heterogeneous

agents, where some agents like ESPN, some like The
Food Network, some like a little bit of ESPN, some
like a little bit of The Food Network.

When you put

in those parameters, you get back what prices and
choices should be according to the model, and you just
rerun the model over and over at different levels of
those parameters until you’re matching what you see in
the data.
If you tried to put in parameters where
people really love The Weather Channel, then your
model would say, “Well, The Weather Channel’s price
should be really high.”

But when you look at the

data, The Weather Channel’s price is not very high, so
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your model is going to say people don’t like The
Weather Channel that much.
That’s the discipline.
[Slide] In the bundling example we match
things like the market shares for each package in each
local market, the prices charged by the cable and
satellite operators, how much time was being watched
on each channel, the spread or the variance in time
being watched on each channel — some people watch an
hour of ESPN a day; some people watch ten minutes —
and so on.
We did that for about five years of data.
Again, there are lots of details that Ariel worked out
for how to do it that we don’t have time to cover.
[Slide] Then you get all that and then you
run your simulation.

This is your but-for world.

You

have your model, you have your parameters, and you
just change something in the mathematical system to
mimic what you want to examine.
The key additional assumption here is that
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the parameters are invariant to the change that you’re
considering.

If you want to consider unbundling, the

assumption is that if we were to force unbundling,
people’s tastes wouldn’t change; people wouldn’t all
of a sudden like more ESPN or like more The Weather
Channel.

That’s the invariance assumption.
[Slide] What we did here is we said in the

context of the computer simulation: “Okay, cable
providers, satellite providers, you can’t offer
packages; you have to offer a price for each channel.”
[Slide] Then we just ran the whole
equilibrium and got back an answer.
tables like these.

You end up with

One of the benefits of this is

that you can talk about very specific outcomes for
different types of agents.
But, just focusing on the bottom, this is
what we estimate under bundling, that 88 percent of
the country was subscribing to cable.

Back then they

were paying about $30 — this is year 2000 dollars —
and we had measures for consumer surplus and industry
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profits.
Then we do the counterfactual simulation.
We did two counterfactual simulations.

This one I’ll

talk about later.
This is a counterfactual simulation forcing
bundling but holding all the prices of the content
fixed.

They set a price.

Comcast has to offer à la

carte pricing, but the price between Comcast and ESPN
is fixed in the input rates.

There we predict that

consumers would be way better off if you were to ban
bundling.
There is a next step in that, which I’m
going to defer for a little bit, where we then add in
the content market, and that’s the next part and the
answers change.

But that’s the overall procedure.

[Slide] The benefits: Integrate data with
economic theory closely.

When you’re doing that you

make the assumptions about each agent’s behavior
explicit.

Often these legal discussions, or in the

regression analysis, it’s very murky what assumptions
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you’re actually making.
disagreement is.

It’s hard to figure where the

You can stimulate outcomes for

situations you haven’t seen before, and you can
measure benefits that are defining the model, like
consumer welfare.
[Slide] The caveats:
• They are computationally costly.
papers take years to write.

My

The models sometimes take

weeks to run, and then, if you want to change one
thing and see what happens, that’s another three
weeks.

It can get expensive.
• Data requirements?

They don’t require

that much different data than other — I actually think
the data requirements are looser.

Through the context

of the model you can bring in related data, but they
are unforgiving when you have things like missing
data.

If you’re missing data for one firm in the

market, what do you do there?

It makes it very stark

that you have a problem.
• The final thing is, of course, economic
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theory is not fully developed in many of these areas.
We write down these models, multiple sets of
assumptions that are a priori reasonable, and you
start arguing about them, and then you’re in this —
MR. KEYTE:

One question I have for you

before we talk to the lawyers.

What if in your model,

your counterfactual, you’re creating new vertical
relationships that might result in double
marginalization?

How do you model those things,

changes in a sense — and maybe that’s what you were
referring to in the content side — changes in the
supply chain as part of your counterfactual?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

I want to talk about that.

[Slide] I was talking about a but-for world
where all you’re changing the distribution to
consumers, and I said we’re holding fixed the content
stuff.
You asked me to talk about what’s ongoing
and what’s coming up next, and that’s when I was going
to talk about the upstream market in that context, but
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I’ll definitely get to that.
MR. KEYTE:

Let’s turn to the lawyers and

first ask the basic question of Art and Ken: Did you
know this was going on at all, and to what extent; and
how have you been exposed to this kind of modeling
versus what are just either straight regressions or
natural experiments or just correlations?

What has

been the exposure, if at all?
MR. BURKE:
fairly limited.

I think the answer is it’s

We can talk a little bit about the

Major League Baseball (MLB)/National Hockey League
(NHL) case that we worked on where this did play a
central role.

But I would say that it did actually

play a big role in the Cigna/Anthem case where the DOJ
relied on this kind of modeling.
But I would say it’s a bit bleeding edge,
and it certainly is not as widely understood as a lot
of other kinds of economic tools that lawyers are more
familiar with, which is why I think this is a terrific
panel to further clarify and expand the understanding
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of this area.
MR. KEYTE:

Ken?

MR. SCHWARTZ:
something we run across.

Absolutely right.

It’s

When I work with economists,

we try to think about what all the arrows are we have
in our quiver, and we always get a menu of “Here’s the
different analyses we can do.”
As an advocate, we’re also looking at
budgets, and typically you’ll start with some basic
observations and then go into more complicated
regressions.

Always at the bottom the last couple of

years was this merger simulation or some type of
structural modeling.

Typically, there was an extra

zero in the budget column, and frequently the
economists would say, “It’s there and it’s worth
exploring, but let’s hold off and see where the
agencies are at.”
MR. KEYTE:

Do you get a sense — and again,

you mentioned the Cigna merger, where they did a
hypothetical monopolist test with structural modeling,
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and then the other side was using regressions — that
historically the DOJ or the FTC are using more of
this?
Sometimes they have more time; they get a
head start.
industry.

Sometimes they’re looking at the

And they have more data; because they have

subpoena power, they get more information.

Other than

what you see that comes out in the occasional press
release or something that’s litigated, how long have
you been seeing them — we walk in, and they’re doing
something you’re not doing?
MR. BURKE:

I think it is something that you

encounter with increasing frequency.

It does go to

the fact that with subpoena power the agencies do have
the ability to create more robust models than perhaps
the parties do, given that they just perhaps have
their own data and maybe the counterparties’ data.
But they don’t have the rest of the marketplace.

So,

it’s something where you’re always at a disadvantage.
We’ve all been in those meetings where the
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government says: “We’ve got this great model that
shows your prices are going to go up, but we can’t
really share it with you.
MR. KEYTE:

Just take it on faith.”

Have you seen a distinction

between — UPP, when we were first exposed to, it I
realized that my daughter in seventh grade could
easily do if I gave her two pieces of information — no
offense to those who do a lot of UPP.
Here you’re getting more to at least the
possibility, depending on the data, of really saying:
“Here’s how the current world is working from a demand
side, from the cost or supply side.”

You remove

something, and then — at least from some of the
practitioners’ perspective — it gets a little murky.
In the counterfactual, how much can you do in a sense
beyond UPP where you hold all that static?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

My reaction — and James and I

wrote an article on UPP that was slammed by many
critics out there — you don’t see the government
presenting UPP as evidence at trial whereas you would
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see these merger simulations being presented.

I know

Aviv Nevo presented in Aetna/Humana, and the court
said: “This is directionally correct.

It doesn’t have

to tell me that there’s an exact price increase or
what that price increase is, but it shows an
incentive,” and taken together with the other evidence
the court found that compelling.
I still have yet to see the government stand
in front of a judge and say, “Hey, we ran the UPPs;
why are we here?”
MR. BURKE:

To be fair, I think the UPP

model was always designed to be a filter that was
supposedly to tell you where you need to look in
greater detail.

It wasn’t necessarily meant to be the

ultimate predictor of whether a merger is
anticompetitive or not.
MR. KEYTE:

And there’s no doubt that some

jurisdictions have made it more of a presumption than
others.
I haven’t really tested this question to see
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whether any of you have views.
PROF. PAKES:
MR. KEYTE:

In AT&T/Time Warner —

You should ask him about AT&T.
I’m going to ask the question.

What was that in Carl Shapiro’s model — and Dennis
Carlton addressed it — where does it fit in the world
of structuring model?
different 4.0?

Is it 2.0, 3.0?

But where does it fit?

Is there a
We all read

about it, we read about the model, and we know how it
was criticized by the court, and we know it’s on
appeal, so if you’re obviously on the matter — perhaps
not.
PROF. PAKES:
we do?

Can I ask you one thing before

The only thing I want to point out is that

computers have gotten a lot better.
faster.

No, quite seriously.

They’re a lot

The data is better

because of computers largely, and the people sitting
at the DOJ and the FTC now have doctorates and have
learned this stuff.

It’s true that it takes more time

and it has not filtered through yet, but it’s going to
be coming in.

That’s for sure.
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MR. KEYTE:

I’ll ask it a two-part question.

Does anybody have a view of what you would call that,
where it fits in in AT&T/Time Warner?

And the second

question is, what’s the next variation of that?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

Okay.

two or three slides I have here.
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

Those two tie into
Is it all right?

Thank you.

[Slide] So you suggested that I talk about
what’s coming next.

If you think about the sort of

mode of analysis, it’s very general.

Merger

simulation in a downstream market is the most-trodden
path, but anything you can model and get data is
potentially fair game.

That could be things like

adding an upstream market, like the content makers.
It could be adding dynamics like investment, product
positioning, and entry and exit.

It could also be

thinking about multiple complementary parts.
Think about the input markets, which relates
to AT&T/Time Warner.

If you could think about the

mergers between — there was Dish/DirecTV in 2000, that
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proposed merger, which was a horizontal merger there,
and a horizontal merger with content going on.
You can also fit vertical mergers into here,
but then you have to extend the model to have the
channels, and you have to talk about what are the
actions and the chaos of the channels.
that out, it’s very complicated.

When we draw

You can think about

Comcast setting prices to consumers.

What’s going on

there is a much more fee for negotiations.

Everything

is interconnected, what Comcast does with ESPN affects
DirecTV, and what DirecTV does with [inaudible].
Everything is sort of in this interconnected
bargaining world, so you need to model for that.
[Slide] We’ve built models for that.
They’re complicated, and that was the model that was
at question in AT&T/Time Warner.
what the DOJ described.

I don’t call that

It’s firmly in the world of

structural modeling.
There’s a question of how well done it was
and whether that was the best evidence in that case,
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how good the data was.

I’m not talking about that.

I’m not trying to provide any support for that.
But this is firmly in the world and fits
into what we’re talking about.

They made a model that

estimated the broader parameters, they simulated a
vertical merger, and that’s how they came up with
their numbers.
[Slide] In bundling you had a similar thing.
It wasn’t a vertical merger, but you watch it and take
into account what happens when ESPN and the content
makers react to the regulation.

When you do that you

get numbers which are quite different.

In fact, we

found that consumers are basically no better off on
average.

The industry is a little bit better off, but

consumers are no better off.

There are winners and

losers, but on average we didn’t find anyone was
better off for that data and that time period.
Another two places, in addition to adding
input markets, which I think are really important and
you’re going to see over the next several years –

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

40

there are already people with their foot in the door,
a lot of people knocking – is dynamics, such as
entry/exit, channel quality.

Like in the bundling, I

assume that all the channels would have the same
quality after you ban bundling.
In reality, some channels might go out of
business and some new channels might enter.

Some

channels might invest more; some channels might invest
less.

That’s the world of dynamics.

You can model

it, you can get data on it, and it fits.

The problem

is it’s harder to model and it’s harder to get data on
it because these are long-term outcomes that require
many years of data.
So, I would say that dynamics is the
Achilles’ heel of this analysis at the moment for
antitrust.
[Slide] Another thing I think we’re going to
see more of is models of mergers between complements.
I studied TV, so there was Sony buying Columbia
Pictures, a TV manufacturer buying a movie and TV
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studio.

It wouldn’t surprise me if we see proposed

mergers like Apple/Spotify, Samsung/Netflix, that sort
of thing — maybe not those exact ones, but those are
complementary product markets where you’ll have to
model multiple product markets at once.

Again, if you

can get data on it or write it down, it’s fair game.
That’s where I think we’re going.
MR. KEYTE:

Ariel, just to reiterate —

because I think the critical threshold issue is if you
can get data on it — is the idea that you have to get
enough data to replicate, to solve, to calibrate, for
the real-world environment in terms of price shares or
other characteristics?
PROF. PAKES:

Is that the starting point?
Let me just push on what Ali

said and then I’ll come back to that.
Parts of it, the dynamics, if you tell me
who the entrant is going to be, I can evaluate entry
in the same framework that I evaluated everything
else.

I can tell you whether an entrant — you have to

tell me who the entrant is, its characteristics, what
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kind of product it has, but I can predict whether he
or she will make profits or not.
The issue that becomes difficult is when you
don’t know what is about to come down the road — such
as innovation and probably part of the content — we
really don’t know what new content is coming.

And we

don’t know the incentives, how the incentives will
play out to generate new content.
Moreover, it gets harder for R&D and for all
of the technologically progressive issues.

It gets

harder partly because when you’re doing research on a
particular product or a particular way of doing
something — it doesn’t matter how many observations
you have, it may not be possible to do the thing, so
errors don’t average out like in the law of large
numbers.

Those kinds of things are the hard things.
You shouldn’t get me wrong.

It doesn’t mean

we can’t do any of them, but there are some that —
we can do entry.

We could do Ali’s

changing of the supply chain if you tell me which one
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is going to change.

Things like that we can do.

On the data side, at some point you come
down to the question: can you do better than the nextbest alternative?
never get it right.
right.

That’s really the question.

We

None of our structural models are

The world is just too complicated for that.

But the question is: can we give you a better answer
than the next-best alternative?
You look at your data.

I can remember when

General Motors asked me to do a dynamic of what would
happen if we put in certain kinds of cars?

I told the

vice-president, “You can do that better than me.”
Right now we’re just not set up to do a good job on
that.
There is a play-off.

It depends what the

other guy is — what can you get from the other way of
doing it?

Can you do better the other way?
I think HHIs, you might look at them, but

you shouldn’t use them for anything detailed.
just ridiculous.
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There are other things you might know.

It

might be from the documents that the firm produces
you’ll know stuff.

There are lots of other ways of

getting information, and it’s just a question of
what’s better.
MR. KEYTE:

Art, I wonder if it would be

useful to talk a little bit about, in terms of
information and data, the Laumann case, as it has been
the only litigated case over is there a threshold met
in terms of replicating the —
MR. BURKE:

Yes.

It’s a very interesting

case where this type of modeling was used in
connection with class certification.

The issue in the

case —
MR. KEYTE:

And we three worked on it.

I

guess we have to disclose that.
MR. BURKE:

The issue in the case was

similar to what Ali’s analysis was.

It was a kind of

unbundling question but in a somewhat different
context.
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As folks may know, most of the sports
leagues have rules that say that you can only
broadcast your signal within your certain team radius,
a certain designated market area (DMA), a certain
metropolitan area, and if you live outside that
metropolitan area, the only way you can get games from
a team — if you’re a Yankees fan and you live in
Florida, there is a certain number of games that are
on national networks, but otherwise you can’t get the
Yankees Entertainment and Sports (YES) Network with
all of the games in Florida.
league rules to be sold.

That’s not permitted by

The only way you can get

those games is if you buy an out-of-league package,
which includes not just the Yankees but all the other
teams in Major League Baseball.

Let’s assume it’s

pretty much similar for hockey and for basketball as
well.
The plaintiffs in the case argued that was
anticompetitive and, similar to some of the
legislative calls for unbundling, they argued that “If
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I’m a Yankees fan in Florida, I should be able to buy
just the Yankees.

I shouldn’t have to buy a bundle

that includes a lot of teams that I don’t want to
follow.”
The difficulty in doing that is that there
is no empirical evidence of what the world looks like
when that happens, so there wasn’t any kind of
benchmark.

A lot of things that we’re more familiar

with as lawyers, the usual economic tools that we
think of for proving common impact in an overcharge
case — you say: “Well, there’s a 10 percent
overcharge.

Who was hurt?” — that kind of simplistic

stuff just wasn’t available.
The plaintiffs actually used a version of
the Yurukoglu-Crawford model and adapted it, or
attempted to adapt it, for this unbundling scenario.
It was obviously challenged on Daubert grounds, a
class certification, on a whole host of issues.
But the issue that got the most attention
from the court was a question about whether there was
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sufficient data to project the demand side.

We were

talking about each of these models has a demand
ecosystem and a supply, and you put them together and
you get some kind of equilibrium.
In this case the question was: was there
sufficient evidence about consumer demand?
out was that there really wasn’t.

What came

The judge concluded

there was a very tiny sliver of data for actual
consumers and that in the absence of other data it was
necessary that the expert who was putting forth the
model essentially created what he called “avatars,”
which I thought was kind of a cool concept, but
they’re not like the ones in the movie; they’re madeup people.
The way the court described it was that they
were essentially “mathematical DNA.”

They were

hypothetical people with made-up demand
characteristics, but they weren’t really derived from
actual real-world data.
At the end of the day, the judge concluded
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that that was insufficient.

Because of the

deficiencies in the data, the model produced a number
of anomalous outcomes, and that was a big source of
dispute.

A big issue in the class certification

hearing was that, because these avatars weren’t really
created with real-world data but were just sort of
mathematical DNA, when you ran the model and changed
certain parameters it spit out a lot of results that
didn’t make any sense.

That was a point which I think

was very compelling to the court.
What was interesting again, just to sum up,
was the court said, “What should the plaintiff’s
expert have done?”
The answer was, “He should have gotten more
data about consumer preferences.” He noted that the
Yurukoglu-and-Crawford model was based upon a lot of
consumer survey data, and that it is quite common in
these kinds of models to go out and, if you’ve got a
deficiency in data, not to make it up with
mathematical DNA, but to actually try to get more
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robust information from consumers about what their
real-world preferences are.
I think it’s probably likely, even though
there were a host of other criticisms of the model,
that if the plaintiffs’ expert had gone and done that,
there’s a pretty good chance the court would have
found the model sufficient to get past Daubert and
probably sufficient to justify class certification.
Certainly, there was no doubt that the model
as a whole was broadly accepted.

It’s published in a

scholarly journal, so the whole debate of class
certification was not about is this kind of modeling
acceptable.

That was taken as a given.

It was: is the implementation appropriate?
It was an interesting lesson in trying to apply those
kinds of models in the real world.
MR. KEYTE:

Ali and Ariel, there is a lot

more to that, depending on what industry you’re
looking at.

But how often, or is typical that you go

out, whether it’s academics or part of a project, and
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do these conjoint surveys or survey work to try to
estimate demand?

I don’t know if you’d do it on the

supply side.
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

We use any data that we

think has integrity and would be useful for the
analysis.

Sometimes in surveys you worry that people

aren’t incentivized to answer in any meaningful way.
But mostly we’re looking for what choices people made,
what products they bought, and how much they paid for
them.
MR. KEYTE:
import any change?

In the surveys do you try to
Are these surveys to try to derive

some elasticities or —
PROF. PAKES:

Conjoint analysis isn’t really

a survey.
MR. KEYTE:
PROF. PAKES:

Okay.

What is it?

Conjoint analysis is you go to

a person and ask them fifteen questions.

He never

buys anything.

He has five seconds to think between

each question.

He’s comparing very detailed things.
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You might not believe the answers in the end to
something like that.
The surveys that I think Ali is talking
about, and that we both use, are data about what
people did actually purchase.

For example, if you’re

doing healthcare, there is now a lot of data in the
All-Payers Claims data.

You can see exactly who

purchased what, what hospitals they went to.

You

can’t name people, but you can do the demand analysis
with a full set of data on a full state.

You know

what everybody in that state did, what insurance
company they were on, what the insurance company paid,
and what they paid out of pocket — the works.
available.

It’s

There are industries like that.

For real surveys they actually go out and
ask people what they bought, see what they bought in
the past, and when they changed what they bought and
things like that.
MR. KEYTE:

We know, whether it’s in a

merger context or a litigation context, that sometimes
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it takes a handful of documents that can turn a case,
that can turn a merger.
In this modeling exercise, almost from the
academic side, how do you deal with essentially
qualitative evidence?
be reduced to data?

Is it just a lead if it can’t
How do you deal with intent in

business documents and emails and the kinds of things
that often are attractive to courts or juries but may
not be quantifiable?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

The only way I can think

of using that is it might help you specify your model,
how you lay out what the agents can and can’t do, and
it might give you qualitative support for the
assumptions in your model.

But I’m not quite sure

without more context how to —
MR. KEYTE:

What’s the difference between a

specification and an assumption?
PROF. PAKES:

I think the way you would use

it is you’re going to do something, something in the
world is going to change, and if some document says,
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in response to that kind of action “I’ll do X,” then
you have to model X.
MR. KEYTE:
PROF. PAKES:
X.

You have to.
It makes sense to investigate

That’s the way we would use the documents.
MR. KEYTE:

Then it’s explore data and then

you might use it —
PROF. PAKES:

You explore it in the context

of your — they said they were going to do something,
so you explore what the implication of that would be
in the context of your model.
MR. BURKE:

As the lawyer, I think then you

would have to marshal the model with other evidence.
I’m just a simple country lawyer.
documents.

I start with the

We start with the win-loss data, and then

you get some other stuff, and then maybe you have one
of these models too, and hopefully they roughly all
point in the same direction, and whichever one doesn’t
you try to explain why it doesn’t.

You try to marshal

as much evidence across all those different things.
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It’s not just in isolation.
MR. KEYTE:

And, Ken, in the merger context,

in the old days you would have a shadow team that’s
saying: “Well, let’s see how this works out.

I don’t

necessarily want everybody to be exposed to that.”

Is

there still that approach to modeling where you might
have a testifying, you have a non-testifying, you have
a whole separate —
MR. SCHWARTZ:

It comes back to what’s the

profile of the matter and again what’s the budget.
But we certainly will Red Team our economists at
times, go to a different economist shop and say, “Put
on your government hat, put together the government’s
best case,” so that you have some independent thought
there.
It’s also a way to present to your client:
“If you’re thinking of litigating this challenge,
here’s the government’s best case, and they’re getting
it from someone who hasn’t spent the last year trying
to develop the affirmative arguments.”
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happen.

That’s fairly common.
MR. KEYTE:

In structural modeling, or

whatever you called it, data-intensive modeling of
some nature — it sounds like it can apply to anything
where you have a counterfactual that you’re trying to
explore, whether it’s a regulatory change, whether
it’s antitrust related, non-antitrust related.

Are

there any limits in a sense on what it could apply to?
PROF. PAKES:
it well.

It’s just when you can apply

It’s just a question of what you have in

your hand that you can analyze it with, including
documents, by the way.
MR. KEYTE:

Whether it’s in a horizontal

setting, vertical setting, mergers, class action, what
do you see as, in a sense — and maybe this is an
unfair question — the next big thing, a paper or work
that’s going on now that might say, “Hey, this is a
new aspect of structural modeling that’s going to
stick and that is useful”?

There is always a lag,

especially with the lawyers who are going to see
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something, or the agencies, your grad students,
yourselves.

What’s 4.0 of structural modeling?

PROF. YURUKOGLU:
dynamics.

Stuff I talked about,

People write papers with dynamics in, but I

don’t think we’ve nailed it to the point where it’s
being used in the court system credibly.
Models of investment.

I have a PhD student

I’m advising whose dissertation is about modeling 4G
investment to model a mobile merger.
PROF. PAKES:

My only comment on that is

I’ve been saying dynamics is the next thing coming for
the last fifteen years.
MR. KEYTE:

Just to be clear, when you say

“dynamics” what do you mean?

What’s the breadth of

that?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

Like in the cable

bundling, you ban bundling, you see what consumers
buy; but then there’s another level where the content
makers might change the quality of their content, the
genres that they’re offering, the casts, that sort of
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thing.
MR. KEYTE:

It’s the effects from different

agents that flow from what you’re changing.
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

It’ll take time to happen

and change the product mix.
PROF. PAKES:

It’s investments.

It’s

development of new products and investment in the cost
structure.
MR. KEYTE:

In a dynamic environment, which

from an antitrust perspective — at least if you were
doing the defense side of things and you’re trying to
assess market power — if you have dynamic markets, you
say you can’t even assert that.

But in structural

modeling you’re trying to capture that to the extent
you can.

Is that fair?
PROF. PAKES:

Yes.

Again, what Ali said is

right, which is this is the place where if a lawyer
asks me, I’m not sure I would know more than asking
somebody in the industry who knows a lot about the
industry.

Maybe I would.
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problem.
MR. KEYTE:

Does the academic world in this

kind of modeling try to keep track of how it’s playing
out in the courts, whether it’s accepted, whether it’s
this whole Daubert debate?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

I read all the testimony.

I was actually working a little bit on the other side
on that case, but I read all your guys’ testimony in
the Laumann case.
MR. KEYTE:

Well, they were using their

model without using you.
MR. BURKE:

That was their fatal mistake.

MR. KEYTE:

It was their fatal mistake.

PROF. YURUKOGLU:
MR. KEYTE:

I was in the background.

Any other comments about this

relatively esoteric yet extremely fundamental,
grounded topic?
PROF. PAKES:

I have one comment, which is I

think it’s actually easy to explain.

I could explain

to you — we didn’t do it today — exactly how the
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demand system works.

It’s easy to explain when you

understand it.
It’s harder to do because there are a lot of
details.

There are just a lot of things that have to

fit together, but the basic principles of it are
actually very simple, and the reason we went after the
issues we went after in detail are actually very easy
to explain.
For example, in BLP the major issue is an
ability to allow, especially in retail goods, an
unobserved product characteristic because you can’t
put in all the characteristics of a car.

The

unobserved product characteristic, because it’s
everything that you don’t measure, is probably
correlated with price.

What BLP does is it allows you

to do that.
I could explain to you every detail in a way
that you understand it.
MR. KEYTE:
PROF. PAKES:
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wouldn’t have to do it; you’d just have to understand
what’s going on.

It’s very simple ideas.

MR. KEYTE:

I have one more technical

question.
PROF. YURUKOGLU:

I agree.

What all this is

is really just organized common sense.

We’re running

down our assumptions, we’re bringing in the data, and
we’re putting it all together in explicit fashion.
Sometimes people think that’s just too fancy, too
complicated, but I really think of it as just
organized common sense.
MR. KEYTE:

If somebody goes and reads, some

of this has been worked out both academically and in
some of the decisions, and they will run across the
generalized method of moments.
PROF. PAKES:
what it is.

Ali just finished telling you

You take the data.

MR. KEYTE:

And somebody won the Nobel

Prize.
PROF. PAKES:
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model has a bunch of parameters that have to be fit;
you find the parameters that make it look like the
data and those are the right parameters.
method of moments is.
MR. KEYTE:

That’s all

He got a Nobel Prize for that.
He did.

You start with just, is

it the intuition or qualitative information that says,
“Eh, I think this is something that it may match”?
PROF. YURUKOGLU:
methods on the computer.

No.

It’s all these

There are automated ways of

doing that.
MR. KEYTE:

Let’s open it up to questions.

Guy, identify yourself because we have a record.
QUESTION [Guy Ben-Ishai]:

I’m Guy Ben-Ishai

with The Brattle Group as well.
You actually mentioned something that
resonated with me.

You mentioned a scenario where the

model that was applied to the litigation was
essentially the very same model that was developed and
perhaps even received some legitimacy or was
certified, if you will, in academic research.
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What’s really interesting about structural
models — and I was wondering, Ali — really is that in
most scenarios that’s not the case.
What we do know about the model is, contrary
to what we saw if you were working a PhD in industrial
and organizational psychology in the 1990s, or twenty
or fifteen years ago perhaps, you weren’t going to
look at a merger and HHI and concentration.

That

applies to such a wide range of industries.

I

understand how it would be very generic, it would be
very broad because it has much more than just a system
of thinking about these issues.
But what we see now with the structural
models is that they’re so highly specified that it’s
not just a specific issue, at least to an industry —
although this is not something we’ve mentioned — that
typically when you work on these models they’re not
necessary the very same model that I would even say
frequently was published before.
I guess the question is: as an attorney, how
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do you claim confidence that this is indeed a
reasonable model; and for an economist, how do you get
enough confidence to actually convince the court that,
yes this is the right model for this case?
MR. BURKE:
that.

As the attorney, I will answer

I don’t think that in order to advance a model

the particular model has to have been published.

Even

in the case of Laumann, it was a version of the model
that was then tweaked.
But I think there are many cases where a
model is created specifically for a litigation or for
a particular merger.

Assuming it follows the

methodologies that have been broadly accepted in the
industry, I think it’s potentially a valid model.

I

don’t think you need to have a particular industry
modeled in a published paper in order to be able to
use modeling in a litigation or a merger.
MR. KEYTE:

Any other questions?

[No response]
Thank you to the panel.
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topic, and there will be more in the months and years
to come.

Thank you very much.
[Adjourned: 4:33 p.m.]
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